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Jane Anna Gordon 
Temple University 
One of the unique challenges of reading Les damnés de la terre (The Wretched of 
the Earth) today is that while it is an irredeemably revolutionary text, we live 
in a counter-revolutionary moment or in a global context that has tried very 
hard to discredit even the possibility of revolution. Fanon’s text does not 
only narrate the effective undertaking of an anti-colonial struggle—of what 
is required for people to identify the actual causes of their alienation and 
unfreedom and together to will their elimination—it also outlines the 
various, often dialectical challenges of restructuring a society from the 
bottom up. Guiding and evident in the latter is the flourishing of what 
Fanon suggestively called national consciousness. Elaborating its meaning and 
ongoing usefulness is the focus of this essay. 
 
The Will in General and the General Will 
National consciousness can be illuminated through understanding its 
relationship to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s conception of the general will. While 
challenged as auguring a repressive collectivism that would trample the 
individual liberties at the core of modern conceptions of freedom, the 
general will, the centerpiece of Rousseau’s portrait of democratic legitimacy, 
remains the most important challenge to the prevailing alternative, which 
would suggest that the aggregation of private interests of individual men 
and women is the best that a democratic society can achieve politically.1 
Indeed it was in the name of something akin to a submerged nation and 
general-will-in-the-making that those struggling to bring about an end to 
occupation charged colonial society with political illegitimacy.   
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Political and social orders, which, in Rousseau’s account, were the only 
formations through which right or justice could be pursued, did not emerge 
organically out of nature but were instead based in conventions.2 Most 
dangerous among these were those that suggested that people who could 
coerce compliance from others in so doing conferred legitimacy upon 
themselves.3 The desire to have one’s ability to be self-determining protected 
by others could not be secured by sheer physical domination. What could 
potentially stave off the tendency to collapse into sheer contests of willful 
force was for the state to be directed by the general will or what the 
differences of a people united in trying to create less precarious conditions 
for their lives had in common.  
The general will is what forms social bonds and is what makes it 
possible for societies, as opposed to mere collectivities or amalgamations of 
individuals, to exist.4 Conjoining “generality” with “willing,” Rousseau 
suggested that the polis and political identity necessarily mediates between 
what Patrick Riley5 has called the “minute particulars” or reified 
particularities that would fix their borders as stone and the universal, which 
would seek absolute limitlessness.  Within certain, permeable bounds, the 
general will seeks to integrate meaningfully abiding differences. Simply 
stated, it is the reflective expression of the people as citizens considering the 
necessary conditions for their specific, ongoing, shared existence. Or put 
differently, it is what emerges when the whole community considers 
questions that pertain to the entire community.  
Acts of the general will are those of sovereign legislation that aim at 
general well-being and common conservation. It is a set of ideas or 
conclusions with which one cannot disagree without having been 
fundamentally misled. Its aim is to unite individuals into a single body that 
makes the infliction of isolated harm impossible so that that all are mutually 
implicated.6 Although Rousseau did not think that one could achieve 
absolute economic equality, the aim of the general will was to secure 
conditions in which citizens were sufficiently equal that general laws could 
effect all comparably. In societies in which one person was affluent enough 
to buy another while others needed to sell themselves, the interests of each 
would necessarily be opposed. Under such conditions, no overarching 
general will could incorporate both. This was the case in the Roman 
Republic in which patricians and plebeians in fact formed two states in one.7 
Rousseau emphasized that the equality he described, while certainly not 
natural, was not a “speculative fiction.”8 If abuses were inevitable, they 
could and should be regulated. It is precisely because all other forces tended 
to destroy equality that politics, which articulated otherwise differently 
located and disparate people into a shared identity, could play the role of 
counterweight. On this view, sovereignty and the general will are indivisible 
and inalienable, since the general will is general or it is not. Guiding and 
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embodying the general will is, in other words, also the preservation of this 
generality or the future possibility of the general will.  
Finally, the general will, which tends toward equality, is contrasted 
with the will in general or the sum of private interests and preferences of 
individual men and women.9 The general will does not, as some have 
suggested, seek to eliminate these more particular interests. It does frame 
them as secondary and subsidiary to a shared will that sustains a domain of 
general life that requires a mutuality and reciprocity rooted in consent that 
can be both given and retracted. In healthier polities, the general will and 
will in general are more likely to coincide since, in these instances, 
individual citizens maintain a clearer sense of how intertwined are 
individual and community needs and concerns. While a general will can be 
arrived at numerically through voting, it is less the number of votes that 
affirms its content as the interest that unites them. It is the outcome of most 
citizens’ answer to the question of that to which we consent to as right for 
all.10  
While the general will is neither foreign nor alien to us, it is only one 
will of many that we feel and may be muted or trumped. It may not speak to 
us as audibly as private interests that might frame it as gratuitous and 
burdensome.11 In addition, effective leaders of groups smaller than the 
polity may frame the pursuit of the general will that sustains them (which is 
more particular and less comprehensive than the polity itself) as sufficient. 
Even then, because what legitimates a given political outcome is an ability to 
suggest that it is of common benefit, they may cynically mask narrower 
ambitions under its banner. Pursuing these as if they were indispensable to 
the preservation of generality (while they in fact will challenge and undercut 
it), renders the relevant divergent set of interests less negotiable, more likely 
to be treated as an exclusive, antagonistic end. In other words, while 
Rousseau hoped that the general will would be self-evident to every citizen, 
it could be very difficult to discern. In a hope to avoid the destructive 
consequences that could follow from manipulating such ambiguity, 
Rousseau argues that we must commit in advance to being forced by others 
to obey the dictates of the general will, even when we might seek to break 
with it or its specific content. Absent this, it could become little more than an 
empty formula.12  
When trying to answer the question of how people unaccustomed to 
being interdependent might become so, Rousseau introduces the figure of a 
legislator or foreign visionary that, much like Max Weber’s successful 
charismatic leaders, offers an inspiring portrait of a shared future the pursuit 
of which would transform all.13 Additionally, he insists on the need for a 
civil religion that would cultivate a set of dogmas designed to sanctify a 
spirit of sociability that would not tolerate intolerance.14 We may evade the 
general will, hiding from the expectations that it suggests, argued Rousseau, 
4 0  |  R e v o l u t i o n a r y  i n  C o u n t e r - R e v o l u t i o n a r y  T i m e s  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XIX, No 1 (2011)  |  jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2011.476 
but it did not die in such instances. Legitimacy, the body politic, and politics, 
as a discrete set of relations, do.  
 For many readers, especially those writing in the U.S. in the 1950s, 
Rousseau’s vision of politics anticipated and echoed the worst aspirations of 
their fascist and communist political antagonists. In their view, it promised 
totalitarian outcomes in which a government, while not sovereign, faced no 
divided and therefore limiting powers. Without clearly delineated 
constraints, it would seek to eradicate any and all partial associations that 
might interfere with collective identification or mediate meaningfully 
between the individual and the polity. In so doing, dissenting individuals, 
lacking necessary protections, would be drowned in an intrusive collective 
and conforming culture in which their aspirations and hopes would be 
wholly subordinated to those of everyone else. Emboldened leaders would 
easily frame whatever were their own interests as the general ones of all 
citizens. Worst of all, they would be empowered by Rousseau’s own 
ominous phrase, framing as an expression of citizen’s own moral freedom 
forcing them to comply with an interest that was neither shared nor equal in 
its consequences.15  
In the view of critics of “positive freedom,” any non-repressive modern 
society will teem with diverse conceptions of the good life or of the nature of 
the common good. Unity and agreement on a broad scale on what could be 
considered right for all, on this view, could only be secured through coercive 
manipulation backed by force.16 As a result, the best that one can do 
politically is to devise rules for mutual toleration, to set conditions for 
peaceful co-existence in which each can pursue their interests and 
preferences to the extent that they are able with minimal governmental 
interference. A prerequisite for this is placing debates over the ultimate 
purpose of collective life outside of the formal domain of politics, instead 
enabling people to negotiate such questions within voluntary communities 
of civil society that, unlike political life, they could enter and exit at will.17 
While this vision of modern freedom as “negative liberty” is itself an 
outcome of liberal and bourgeois revolutions that sought to break the 
absolute power of theocratic and monarchical states, it is one that frames the 
political rights of individuals as those that secure their ability to separate 
themselves from others who appear primarily as potential limits on their 
free pursuit of their own private ends. While a useful model for shoring up 
protections of private property from trespassers, this offers no collective 
language through which to articulate legitimacy or illegitimacy. In other 
words, one cannot only in narrow asocial terms of private preferences 
articulate the normative ideals that underpin an emancipatory view of 
politics, ones that would insist that those who rule do so in ways that fall 
short of benefiting or developing a repressed and colonized nation.  
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While Rousseau warned that societies with eroded general wills could 
not be mended, there were also general wills that were still emerging.18 This 
was especially the case in formerly colonized nations, among them Rousseau 
focused on the island of Corsica and on Poland. It is what Fanon also hoped 
would emerge out of the nationalism through which the anti-colonial 
struggle in Algeria had been waged, through the ongoing and dialectical 
praxis through which disparate groups allied to create societies that were no 
longer colonial.  
 
Nationalism and National Consciousness 
Although his early theoretical work on racism and colonialism focused 
primarily on the question of disalienation in terms requiring an 
interrogation of the human sciences, especially psychiatry, Fanon found 
himself in a difficult situation as head of the psychiatric division at Blida-
Joinville Hospital in Algeria at the dawn of the Algerian War.  His 
experience as a soldier twice decorated for valor in World War II, his 
medical knowledge, and his commitment to struggles for freedom led to his 
aiding the Front Liberation Nationale (FLN), his eventual resignation from 
his state-supported position of head psychiatrist, and his formally joining 
the FLN.  The observations and arguments he subsequently made in Les 
damnés are thus informed by his on-the-ground experience in addition to his 
theoretical acumen. 
Fanon suggested that it was only through directly fighting forces of 
repression that a submerged Algerian nation or its general will, squelched 
and rendered irrelevant by colonial relations, could begin to spring to life.19 
He warned that where fatality permeated people, those who oppressed them 
were never blamed.20 Instead the diverse people who together constitute the 
colonized turned to magic, myth, and internal tribal feuds, all of which 
preexisted colonialism, in forms of avoidance that amounted to “collective 
auto-destruction.”21 Although occupying the same physical territory, the 
colonized had little reason to think of themselves as sharing a political 
identity or as belonging to one nation with a potentially sovereign will. 
Indeed their divisions were many: There were, after all, those who managed 
to benefit and those excluded from the advantages of colonial exploitation. 
People living in the countryside saw those living in the towns as having 
taken on European dress and speech, as having betrayed the national 
heritage.22 Urban party and trade union organizers who made tentative, 
arrogant ventures into rural areas frequently ignored the authority of 
respected traditional leaders or the longstanding significance of local clan 
and tribal diversity23 and generally feared the spontaneous violent outbreaks 
of the peasantry. Finally, there were revolutionary political and intellectual 
minorities from the towns who broke with the legalism and reconciliatory 
approaches of recognized local leaders who were imprisoned and then 
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exiled and radicalized by country people ready through armed insurrection 
to take their land back. In an opposite movement were the lumpenproletariat 
who fleeing the destitution of the country swelled the urban fringes. 
Unwilling to be reformed by a colonial society that they could only ever 
enter with the use of force, they came to direct this otherwise unpredictable 
and explosive action decisively toward spearheading “the procession of the 
awakened nation.”24  
  It was initially in efforts to cast off a shared enemy, a shared source of 
alienation, that people placed unequally and disparately within the polity 
developed a sense of a collective fate, a sense of themselves as an emergent 
nation. For it and they to enter history required a combination of all 
engaging in a chain of discrete, local irrevocable dangerous actions from 
which there was no turning back and the deliberate rooting out of local 
rivalries that could stall or interrupt an onward march toward sovereignty.25 
In a confraternity more typical of a church, or the indivisibility of which 
Rousseau spoke, yesterday’s enemies joined together to widen a national 
assault on their occupiers.  
Even then, however, if a “racial feeling” or determination to reject all 
who were foreign was enough to enter a revolutionary fight, it was not 
enough to sustain it.26 Hatred and resentment alone made even some of the 
most resolute easily manipulated, easily bought off. Some would be blinded 
by the simplest of humane gestures, becoming convinced that nicer 
mundane treatment by the colonists (which, in fact, were each extorted 
concessions), itself constituted a victory. And others still would be tempted 
with slightly more, with promises of abandoning the others who continued 
courageously to fight, they would move into positions once occupied by 
settlers, settling with a will of some, with little or no interest in restructuring 
the roles themselves. They would not, as an actual decolonial project 
suggested, continue the reconstructive efforts necessary to make the last 
first. 
 Doing so would require supplementing, broadening, and 
reconstructing this initial nationalism with political, economic, cultural, and 
therapeutic components. Guiding and emerging out of each and all was the 
normative ideal of national consciousness.  
 Fanon first argued for the indispensability of radically democratic 
participation. Colonial relations rendered the vast majority of colonized 
people political children, beneath citizenship, whose aspirations and anger 
were irrelevant to determining the shape and direction of their polity. In 
anti-colonial struggle, people, through fighting, made themselves subjects of 
their own history, seizing responsibility for its present and future. They had 
been told that they were incapable of such agency, only able to understand 
the language of force. Through collective decision-making, Fanon describes 
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the nurturing of the humanity of the people—their eyes and ears expanding 
in a landscape befitting their dignity.  
 But for governmental institutions to become a locus of belonging and 
identification, they had concretely to demonstrate that they connected one 
part of the nation to the others through resource and infrastructural 
provision.  
 Many, with the ousting of a community of settlers, would hope that 
the nation could be an authentic expression of that which was local. This 
would lead many into an orientation of cultural retrieval, of seeking that 
which was most traditional to this place. This quickly could devolve into 
battles over which traditionalism was the purest expression of a people who 
now in fact faced new and different challenges. While recognizing that 
Algerians did indeed have a cultural past was essential to affirming their 
humanity as cultural agents, doing so more meaningfully required seeing 
them as people who could together articulate living culture through which 
to forge a shared, political world of the today. 
 But the challenge of fighting for the emergent nation was not without 
costs. The brutality of a reversed Manicheanism left scars, some of which 
could not be undone. One did not want those traumatized by the battles 
now empowered to run the country. One would need to be able to honor 
them as appropriate and deserved while turning to the next generation to 
develop new models for collective living that grew indigenously out of their 
shared situation.  
 For Fanon, doing justice to the risks taken and lives lost in 
revolutionary battle required ongoing, dialectical constructive work of 
cultivating a unique scope of political identity, that of the nation, which 
would necessarily mediate among class, regional, tribal, ethnic, and racial 
differences, insisting that all shared in a past and future in which all were 
mutually implicated. Securing such sensibilities did not only require 
prioritizing their cultivation but linking legitimate political activity to the 
project of evenly distributed economic and political development. 
 He never diminished the difficulty of this challenge: while insisting 
that economic redistribution on a massive scale was urgent and essential 
(lest societies be shaken to pieces), he was as unforgiving of the national 
bourgeoisie for not putting themselves in the service of the people as he was 
that they failed to become a genuine bourgeoisie: they did not revolutionize 
production in the local economy in ways that would upset the existing 
global division of labor. If they had disproportionately to seize the nation’s 
wealth in what amounted to thieving from governmental coffers, they could 
at least have refuted the role of Europe’s intermediaries, developing a 
distinctive, national model of what it would mean to be a capitalist class.   
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 While Fanon clearly distinguished the possibilities of national 
consciousness from the failures of a narrowed and increasingly cynical 
nationalism, the former is more an evocative and challenging idea than one 
that is fully fleshed out. It is clear that national consciousness, as Rousseau’s 
general will, seeks out and expresses what different people have in common; 
that it moves beyond an antagonism to foreigners who can quickly be 
redefined as racial and ethnic others in a reductio ad absurdum. It is what 
enables and in turn nurtures ongoing mobilization and is therefore hijacked 
and undercut by policies that rely on the retreat of most of the citizenry into 
induced passivity. While drawing on the cultural resources that all bring to 
the table, it seeks to combine and fuse these into distinctive new national 
forms in an open-ended constructive process that will be radically rejected 
by those who in power plays for scarce resources claim that one version of 
traditionalism is the singular and authentic one that should dominate. It can 
finally only emerge out of ongoing praxis, ever incomplete political, cultural, 
economic, and explicitly therapeutic efforts to reduce the causes of 
unfreedom, to make political institutions more responsive, better loci of and 
expressions of a consciousness of what will cultivate national growth. 
Absent a sense of political work as never done, the most recent period of 
mobilization will instead be reified into that which embodied “the nation’s” 
aims and identity and will snidely be invoked by those able to frame the will 
of some as if it were identical with an actual general will.  
 Rousseau’s conception of the general will, while that which tried in 
the most classically modern terms to insist that sovereignty could only 
belong to the active citizenry and that governments, to be legitimate, would 
have to make a task of seeking that which could be shown to maintain rough 
equality, thereby benefiting the citizenry as a whole, gave little account, save 
turning to a mythic legislator, of how a society with norms of legitimacy 
could emerge out of contexts of illegitimacy. Instead Rousseau’s discussion, 
save in the examples of Corsica and Poland, focused on legitimacy as an act 
of preservation, of maintaining conditions and relations under which it first 
emerged. 
 In Fanon, national consciousness emerges only out of deliberate 
challenges to relations of subordination and alienation. It takes shape 
through collaborative struggles first to oust those people, wills, and interests 
fundamentally opposed to the emergence of an indigenous citizenry’s will 
and then to move beyond this to developing institutions that would develop 
a nation that had been an appendage to another, metropolitan center. This 
was ongoing and dialectical, demanding that each generation take on the 
next stage of responsibility, trying to devise models that reflected local needs 
and aspirations. Even then, it is clear that while one could nurture national 
consciousness and that it might even, in some instances, blossom, it 
functioned primarily as a normative ideal through which the larger aim of 
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political legitimacy, of relations that were no longer fundamentally 
exploitative, might be clarified and understood.  
 
By Way of Conclusion 
One of the marks of a counter-revolutionary moment is the massive and 
systematic undercutting of the few niches in which some semblance of 
collective self-governance remains. Part and parcel of this development is 
the rise of relativistic challenges to the possibility of being able to defend 
some political policies and programs as more broadly beneficial to the polity 
than their alternatives (as better instantiations of a general will). While many 
people have accepted as reality the ideological positions that undergird 
neoliberalism—that efforts deliberately to devise political solutions to 
shared troubles will always be so deeply flawed that the battles involved are 
better left unwaged; that the only models of organizing collective life have 
already been conceived and can at best be modestly modified—the 2011 year 
opened with a spate of uprisings moving contagiously through the parts of 
North Africa from which the Fanon we study thought, lived, and wrote.  
Tunisians and Egyptians have called their efforts revolutionary: as instances 
of a national will of a large, diverse, tenaciously resolved and courageous 
group of people who, facing life-threatening repression, watched what they 
demanded—the stepping down of a geriatric leader who embodied the 
obstacle to their aspirations—come to pass. It is not clear whether what will 
come next will be revolutionary in the sense that we have just explored, 
whether it will move from removing what squelched a fuller realization of a 
general will to the fuller reconstruction of the society from the bottom up. It 
is highly likely that Mubarak, for instance, will be replaced by a small 
bourgeois cadre linked to the military and better aligned with this stage of 
the development of globalized capitalism. If this were to lead to the 
development of a genuinely national bourgeoisie, this would itself be an 
important development. Even if its role would ultimately be as the next line 
against which people seeking a fuller realization of national consciousness 
must struggle.  
 Most striking is the seeming impossibility of countering counter-
revolutionary norms without some notion of a general will or of national 
consciousness, of demands linked to preserving a discrete form of political 
identity that is smaller than the globe but that mediates among more 
particular and smaller forms of identity and belonging. It is in the name of a 
unit that incorporates meaningful and abiding differences of class, race, 
ethnicity, religion, and gender, that one tries to counteract otherwise 
inevitable inequalities, to articulate a sense of shared fate that is deliberately 
constructed by we, ever flawed and ever aspiring, political animals.  
 
4 6  |  R e v o l u t i o n a r y  i n  C o u n t e r - R e v o l u t i o n a r y  T i m e s  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XIX, No 1 (2011)  |  jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2011.476 
 
                                                                
 
1For examples of such criticisms, see C.E. Vaughan, “Introduction,” in The Political Writings of 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1915); Lester Crocker, 
“Rousseau’s Soi-distant Liberty,” in Rousseau and Liberty, edited by Robert Wokler. 
(Manchester, UK: University of Manchester Press, 1995); and J.L. Talmon, The Origins of 
Totalitarian Democracy. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1952/1986). 
2 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Contract Social. Chronologie et introduction par Pierre Burgelin. 
(Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1966), Chapter One, Section Two. 
3 Rousseau, Du Contract Social, Book I, Chapter 3. 
4 Rousseau, Du Contract Social, Book II, Chapter 1. 
5 Patrick Riley, The General Will Before Rousseau: The Transformation of the Divine into the Civic. 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). 
6 Rousseau, Du Contract Social, Book I, Chapter 6. 
7 Rousseau, Du Contract Social, Book IV, Chapter 2. 
8 Rousseau, Du Contract Social, Book II, Chapter 11. 
9 Rousseau, Du Contract Social, Book II, Chapter 3. 
10 Rousseau, Du Contract Social, Book IV, Chapter 2. 
11 Rousseau, Du Contract Social, Book I, Chapter 7. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Rousseau, Du Contract Social, Book II, Chapter 7. 
14 Rousseau, Du Contract Social, Book IV, Chapter 8. 
15 Again, see Vaughan, Crocker, Talmon, and, in addition, Leonard Schapiro, Totalitarianism. 
(London: Macmillan, 1972) and Steven Johnston, Encountering Tragedy: Rousseau and the 
Tragedy of Democratic Order. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). 
16 For the classic, representative statement of this position, see Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of 
Liberty” in Four Essays on Liberty. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). 
17 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Second Edition. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005). 
18 Rousseau, Du Contract Social, Book II, Chapter 8. 
19 Frantz Fanon, Les damnés de la terre, préface. (Paris: Gallimard, 1961), 169; The Wretched of 
the Earth, Preface by Jean-Paul Sartre, trs. Constance Farrington. (New York: Grove Press, 
1969), 131. 
20 Fanon, Les damnés, 85/54. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Fanon, Les damnés, 150/112. 
 
J a n e  A n n a  G o r d o n  |  4 7  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XIX, No 1 (2011)  |  jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2011.476 
 
23 Fanon, Les damnés, 151/113. 
24 Fanon, Les damnés, 168/130. 
25 Fanon, Les damnés, 170/132. 
26 Fanon, Les damnés, 177/139. 
